sliding-sync/sync2/tokens_table.go

261 lines
8.1 KiB
Go
Raw Permalink Normal View History

2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
package sync2
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx"
"io"
"strings"
"time"
)
type Token struct {
AccessToken string
2023-04-28 13:24:22 +01:00
AccessTokenHash string
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
AccessTokenEncrypted string `db:"token_encrypted"`
UserID string `db:"user_id"`
DeviceID string `db:"device_id"`
LastSeen time.Time `db:"last_seen"`
}
// TokensTable remembers sync v2 tokens
type TokensTable struct {
db *sqlx.DB
// A separate secret used to en/decrypt access tokens prior to / after retrieval from the database.
// This provides additional security as a simple SQL injection attack would be insufficient to retrieve
// users access tokens due to the encryption key not living inside the database / on that machine at all.
// https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cryptographic_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html#separation-of-keys-and-data
// We cannot use bcrypt/scrypt as we need the plaintext to do sync requests!
key256 []byte
}
// NewTokensTable creates the syncv3_sync2_tokens table if it does not already exist.
func NewTokensTable(db *sqlx.DB, secret string) *TokensTable {
db.MustExec(`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS syncv3_sync2_tokens (
token_hash TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY, -- SHA256(access token)
token_encrypted TEXT NOT NULL,
-- TODO: FK constraints to devices table?
user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
device_id TEXT NOT NULL,
last_seen TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL
);`)
// derive the key from the secret
hash := sha256.New()
hash.Write([]byte(secret))
return &TokensTable{
db: db,
key256: hash.Sum(nil),
}
}
func (t *TokensTable) encrypt(token string) string {
block, err := aes.NewCipher(t.key256)
if err != nil {
panic("sync2.DevicesTable encrypt: " + err.Error())
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
panic("sync2.DevicesTable encrypt: " + err.Error())
}
nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())
if _, err = io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, nonce); err != nil {
panic("sync2.DevicesTable encrypt: " + err.Error())
}
return hex.EncodeToString(nonce) + " " + hex.EncodeToString(gcm.Seal(nil, nonce, []byte(token), nil))
}
func (t *TokensTable) decrypt(nonceAndEncToken string) (string, error) {
2023-05-03 18:43:16 +01:00
return decrypt(nonceAndEncToken, t.key256)
}
// Pulled out to a free function to use in the device ID migration.
func decrypt(nonceAndEncToken string, key []byte) (string, error) {
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
segs := strings.Split(nonceAndEncToken, " ")
nonce := segs[0]
nonceBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(nonce)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("decrypt nonce: failed to decode hex: %s", err)
}
encToken := segs[1]
ciphertext, err := hex.DecodeString(encToken)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("decrypt token: failed to decode hex: %s", err)
}
2023-05-03 18:43:16 +01:00
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
aesgcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
token, err := aesgcm.Open(nil, nonceBytes, ciphertext, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(token), nil
}
func hashToken(accessToken string) string {
// important that this is a cryptographically secure hash function to prevent
// preimage attacks where Eve can use a fake token to hash to an existing device ID
// on the server.
hash := sha256.New()
hash.Write([]byte(accessToken))
return hex.EncodeToString(hash.Sum(nil))
}
// Token retrieves a tokens row from the database if it exists.
// Errors with sql.NoRowsError if the token does not exist.
// Errors with an unspecified error otherwise.
func (t *TokensTable) Token(plaintextToken string) (*Token, error) {
tokenHash := hashToken(plaintextToken)
var token Token
err := t.db.Get(
&token,
`SELECT token_encrypted, user_id, device_id, last_seen FROM syncv3_sync2_tokens WHERE token_hash=$1`,
tokenHash,
)
2023-04-28 13:24:22 +01:00
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
2023-04-28 16:10:22 +01:00
token.AccessToken = plaintextToken
2023-04-28 13:24:22 +01:00
token.AccessTokenHash = tokenHash
return &token, nil
}
// TokenForPoller represents a row of the tokens table, together with any data
// maintained by pollers for that token's device.
type TokenForPoller struct {
2023-04-28 16:10:22 +01:00
*Token
2023-04-28 13:24:22 +01:00
Since string `db:"since"`
}
// TokenForEachDevice loads the most recently used token for each device. If given a
// transaction, it will SELECT inside that transaction.
func (t *TokensTable) TokenForEachDevice(txn *sqlx.Tx) (tokens []TokenForPoller, err error) {
var db sqlx.Queryer
if txn != nil {
db = txn
} else {
db = t.db
}
2023-04-28 13:24:22 +01:00
// Fetches the most recently seen token for each device, see e.g.
// https://www.postgresql.org/docs/11/sql-select.html#SQL-DISTINCT
err = sqlx.Select(
db,
2023-04-28 13:24:22 +01:00
&tokens,
`SELECT DISTINCT ON (user_id, device_id) token_encrypted, user_id, device_id, last_seen, since
FROM syncv3_sync2_tokens JOIN syncv3_sync2_devices USING (user_id, device_id)
ORDER BY user_id, device_id, last_seen DESC
`)
if err != nil {
return
}
for _, token := range tokens {
token.AccessToken, err = t.decrypt(token.AccessTokenEncrypted)
if err != nil {
// Ignore decryption failure.
continue
}
token.AccessTokenHash = hashToken(token.AccessToken)
}
return
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
}
// Insert a new token into the table.
func (t *TokensTable) Insert(txn *sqlx.Tx, plaintextToken, userID, deviceID string, lastSeen time.Time) (*Token, error) {
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
hashedToken := hashToken(plaintextToken)
encToken := t.encrypt(plaintextToken)
_, err := txn.Exec(
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
`INSERT INTO syncv3_sync2_tokens(token_hash, token_encrypted, user_id, device_id, last_seen)
2023-04-28 16:10:22 +01:00
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)
ON CONFLICT (token_hash) DO NOTHING;`,
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
hashedToken, encToken, userID, deviceID, lastSeen,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Token{
2023-04-28 16:10:22 +01:00
AccessToken: plaintextToken,
AccessTokenHash: hashedToken,
// Note: if this token already exists in the DB, encToken will differ from
// the DB token_encrypted column. (t.encrypt is nondeterministic, see e.g.
// https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_encryption).
// The rest of the program should ignore this field; it only lives here so
// we can Scan the DB row into the Tokens struct. Could make it private?
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
AccessTokenEncrypted: encToken,
UserID: userID,
DeviceID: deviceID,
LastSeen: lastSeen,
}, nil
}
// MaybeUpdateLastSeen actions a request to update a Token struct with its last_seen value
// in the DB. To avoid spamming the DB with a write every time a sync3 request arrives,
// we only update the last seen timestamp or the if it is at least 24 hours old.
// The timestamp is updated on the Token struct if and only if it is updated in the DB.
func (t *TokensTable) MaybeUpdateLastSeen(token *Token, newLastSeen time.Time) error {
sinceLastSeen := newLastSeen.Sub(token.LastSeen)
if sinceLastSeen < (24 * time.Hour) {
return nil
}
_, err := t.db.Exec(
`UPDATE syncv3_sync2_tokens SET last_seen = $1 WHERE token_hash = $2`,
2023-04-28 13:24:22 +01:00
newLastSeen, token.AccessTokenHash,
2023-04-28 01:03:29 +01:00
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
token.LastSeen = newLastSeen
return nil
}
2023-04-28 12:20:46 +01:00
func (t *TokensTable) GetTokenAndSince(userID, deviceID, tokenHash string) (accessToken, since string, err error) {
var encToken, gotUserID, gotDeviceID string
2023-05-02 17:02:54 +01:00
query := `SELECT token_encrypted, since, user_id, device_id
FROM syncv3_sync2_tokens JOIN syncv3_sync2_devices USING (user_id, device_id)
WHERE token_hash = $1;`
err = t.db.QueryRow(query, tokenHash).Scan(&encToken, &since, &gotUserID, &gotDeviceID)
2023-04-28 12:20:46 +01:00
if err != nil {
return
}
if gotUserID != userID || gotDeviceID != deviceID {
2023-05-02 17:02:54 +01:00
err = fmt.Errorf(
2023-04-28 12:20:46 +01:00
"token (hash %s) found with user+device mismatch: got (%s, %s), expected (%s, %s)",
tokenHash, gotUserID, gotDeviceID, userID, deviceID,
)
2023-05-02 17:02:54 +01:00
return
2023-04-28 12:20:46 +01:00
}
accessToken, err = t.decrypt(encToken)
return
}
// Delete looks up a token by its hash and deletes the row. If no token exists with the
// given hash, a warning is logged but no error is returned.
func (t *TokensTable) Delete(accessTokenHash string) error {
result, err := t.db.Exec(
`DELETE FROM syncv3_sync2_tokens WHERE token_hash = $1`,
accessTokenHash,
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ra, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if ra != 1 {
logger.Warn().Msgf("Tokens.Delete: expected to delete one token, but actually deleted %d", ra)
}
return nil
}